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Bonus Options in Health Insurance: 2 (Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, 2) - Tapa dura

Zweifel, Peter

 
9780792317227: Bonus Options in Health Insurance: 2 (Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, 2)
Tapa dura
ISBN 10: 079231722X ISBN 13: 9780792317227
Editorial: Springer, 1992

Sinopsis

Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today’s socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one’s bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.

"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Críticas

'It is an economic study as it should be: clear questions are raised, hypotheses are derived from theoretical models, and the hypotheses are tested with empirical data.' Health Economics 2:1 1993

Reseña del editor

Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.

"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Editorial
Springer
Año de publicación
1992
Idioma
Inglés
ISBN 10 
079231722X
ISBN 13 
9780792317227
Encuadernación
Tapa dura
Número de páginas
160
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Otras ediciones populares con el mismo título

9789401051170: Bonus Options in Health Insurance: 2 (Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy)

Edición Destacada

ISBN 10:  9401051178 ISBN 13:  9789401051170
Editorial: Springer, 2012
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