The Verification of Arms Control Agreements - Tapa dura

The Verification of Arms Control Agreements

Orange Cloth. Condición: FINE ( UNREAD). Not Illustrated Ilustrador. First Edition. Verification - the procedures whereby it can be checked that States party to an international agreement to control their armaments are sticking to it - has never been the subject of more attention. Since the only arms control agreements worth having are agreements binding States to desist from what they otherwise might have done in the absence of an agreement, worthwhile arms-control agreements were always under pressure. Unless the procedures for verifying that cheating is not taking place are reliable, and seen to be reliable, agreements will have a very short life expectancy indeed. The Central role in which verification is cast is both a boon and a burden. Arms control without a reliable verification provision is a sham: but limiting arms control to what is politically and technically feasible from the verification point of view condemns progress in enlarging the scope of arms-control to a snail's pace. Explaining verification and the need for it is essential if political frustration at the slow rate of progress in arms-control is to be held in check. And putting into perspective the successes and failures of verification in the chief arms-control agreements in force today is equally essential if hastily generalizations about the reliability of verification are to be avoided. This book tries to do both things. It begins with a vigorous new analysis of the nature of verification which challenges much of the conventional wisdom on the subject but in such a way as to reaffirm the centrality of verification to any arms-control process worthy of the name. A series of careful studies is is then presented of verification in action, and with the important exception of the biological weapons convention of 1972, where the authors (writing from independent perspectives) are far from convinced that a breach by the Soviet Union did not take place in Sverdlovsk in 1979, it is shown that cheating on arms-control agreements has almost certainly not occurred. On the other hand none of the contributors draws much comfort from this state of affairs. In the case of the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty, technical problems and the scale of operations always threatens to swamp the verification mechanisms. In the central case of the Soviet-American agreements on nuclear weapons, not only do technical challenges to verification arise almost daily, but the United States government has also found it difficult, even when verification machinery is working exactly as planned, to convince the American public of the fact!.95pp including notes. A FINE (UNREAD) copy.This book will be POSTED AT OUR STANDARD RATES FULLY INSURED (UK) ONLY . Please email for further details or Direct Enquiries Tel : 01822 810108. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾". Not Inscribed or Signed. Nº de ref. del artículo: 009510

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