This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.
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This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.
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Librería: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Hardback. Condición: Good. This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law. Nº de ref. del artículo: 00105672247
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Librería: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: Very Good. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. Nº de ref. del artículo: 5085116-6
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Librería: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. Nº de ref. del artículo: 11548663-6
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Librería: HPB-Emerald, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority! Nº de ref. del artículo: S_477728436
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Reno, Reno, NV, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0631157093I4N00
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Former library book; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0631157093I3N10
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0631157093I4N00
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0631157093I3N00
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Librería: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, Estados Unidos de America
hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Nº de ref. del artículo: mon0003067989
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Librería: World of Books Inc, Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Hardback. Condición: Good. This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law. Nº de ref. del artículo: CIN0631157093G
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