Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.
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Charlotte y Peter Fiell son dos autoridades en historia, teoría y crítica del diseño y han escrito más de sesenta libros sobre la materia, muchos de los cuales se han convertido en éxitos de ventas. También han impartido conferencias y cursos como profesores invitados, han comisariado exposiciones y asesorado a fabricantes, museos, salas de subastas y grandes coleccionistas privados de todo el mundo. Los Fiell han escrito numerosos libros para TASCHEN, entre los que se incluyen 1000 Chairs, Diseño del siglo XX, El diseño industrial de la A a la Z, Scandinavian Design y Diseño del siglo XXI.
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First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. Nº de ref. del artículo: 383753
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First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. Nº de ref. del artículo: 383753
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centers on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation. By providing an analytic framework in which questions about nuclear deterrence may be asked more precisely and the consequences of different strategies explored more extensively, the book provides a foundation for further advances in deterrence theory.An appendix offers the nonspecialist an introduction to game theory and to the models the author develops in the text. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780521375276
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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.InhaltsverzeichnisPreface 1. Introduction 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility 3. Nº de ref. del artículo: 446933366
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