Sinopsis
The problem of abstract entities is one with which philosophers have grappled since Plato's time. Questions like "What are universals?", "What are numbers?", as well as the very general "What are abstract entities?", seem to be some of the most puzzling in philosophy. In this book, the author approaches such questions via an account of the logic of abstract terms. Such terms, he argues, have in common that they are eliminable by paraphrase, in a way that undercuts realism (or Platonism), while allowing for the truth of such truisms as "There are properties". In Part 1 the general problem is tackled, the discussion ranging over such topics as quantification, logical form, eliminative paraphrase, and formal concepts. In Part 2, two "case histories" are presented - those of universals and events. A sustained attack is launched upon realisms about each of these, and a nominalist alternative is argued for.
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Reseña del editor
The problem of abstract entities is one with which philosophers have grappled since Plato's time. Questions like "What are universals?", "What are numbers?", as well as the very general "What are abstract entities?", seem to be some of the most puzzling in philosophy. In this book, the author approaches such questions via an account of the logic of abstract terms. Such terms, he argues, have in common that they are eliminable by paraphrase, in a way that undercuts realism (or Platonism), while allowing for the truth of such truisms as "There are properties". In Part 1 the general problem is tackled, the discussion ranging over such topics as quantification, logical form, eliminative paraphrase, and formal concepts. In Part 2, two "case histories" are presented - those of universals and events. A sustained attack is launched upon realisms about each of these, and a nominalist alternative is argued for.
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