This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory, while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Julian Dodd is Lecturer in Philosophy, Bolton Institute.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
EUR 28,79 gastos de envío desde Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoGRATIS gastos de envío en Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoLibrería: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer.The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book. This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. Nº de ref. del artículo: ABLIING23Feb2215580105866
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9780312231996_new
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer.The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book. 212 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
Condición: New. BIC Classification: JPP. Dimension: 216 x 140. Weight in Grams: 420. . 2000. Hardback. . . . . Nº de ref. del artículo: V9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 15 disponibles
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities they are, as Frege. Nº de ref. del artículo: 446876480
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 199 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-0312231997
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware -This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer.The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 212 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. BIC Classification: JPP. Dimension: 216 x 140. Weight in Grams: 420. . 2000. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Nº de ref. del artículo: V9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 15 disponibles
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer.The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780312231996
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles