Sinopsis
Examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperation games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the text addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
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Críticas
-- Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University " Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions." -- Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University & quot; Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions.& quot; -- Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University "Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions."--Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Reseña del editor
Examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, and strict Nash equilibria.
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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)
Publicado por
The MIT Press, 1997
ISBN 10: 0262193825
ISBN 13: 9780262193825
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Librería: Riverby Books (DC Inventory), Fredericksburg, VA, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Hardcover with dust jacket. Very good condition. Dj is glossy. Binding is strong and tight. Corners are squared and pages are clean. Title page is not dated. Copyright page are dated 1997. 309 pages. Overall very good condition. Please email with questions or to see any photos. We are a real neighborhood bookstore and ship books every day. This listing was written by an actual person with the book in front of them for inspection. Nº de ref. del artículo: F-8964
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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
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The MIT Press (MIT Press Series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution) 1st edn 1997, 1997
ISBN 10: 0262193825
ISBN 13: 9780262193825
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Librería: G. & J. CHESTERS, TAMWORTH, Reino Unido
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Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Dust Jacket Included. 310 pages, a VG+ hardback in a VG+ dustwrapper [0262193825]. Nº de ref. del artículo: 62535
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EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION.
Librería: PASCALE'S BOOKS, NORTH READING, MA, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Hard Cover. Condición: Fine. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Fine. 309 pages. "Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others." FINE HARDCOVER, FINE DUST JACKET. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. Nº de ref. del artículo: 029299
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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning & Social Evolution)
Publicado por
MIT Press 01.04.1997., 1997
ISBN 10: 0262193825
ISBN 13: 9780262193825
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Librería: NEPO UG, Rüsselsheim am Main, Alemania
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Condición: Gut. 328 Seiten nice book ex Library Ohne Schutzumschlag Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 969 23,6 x 16,1 x 2,3 cm, Gebundene Ausgabe. Nº de ref. del artículo: 342875
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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)
Librería: BennettBooksLtd, Los Angeles, CA, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
hardcover. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title! Nº de ref. del artículo: Q-0262193825
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