Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics and Political Economy Series) - Tapa blanda

Adler, E. Scott

 
9780226007564: Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics and Political Economy Series)
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ISBN 10: 0226007561 ISBN 13: 9780226007564
Editorial: University of Chicago Press, 2002

Sinopsis

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

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Acerca del autor

Scott Adler is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

De la contraportada

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress continually obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to other aspects of House structure-the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods-the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s-Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

De la solapa interior

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress continually obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to other aspects of House structure-the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods-the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s-Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Editorial
University of Chicago Press
Año de publicación
2002
Idioma
Inglés
ISBN 10 
0226007561
ISBN 13 
9780226007564
Encuadernación
Tapa blanda
Número de edición
2
Número de páginas
275
Contacto del fabricante
no disponible
Persona responsable
no disponible

Otras ediciones populares con el mismo título

9780226007557: Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics and Political Economy Series)

Edición Destacada

ISBN 10:  0226007553 ISBN 13:  9780226007557
Editorial: University of Chicago Press, 2002
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