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Críticas
a powerful and superbly written short book (Barry Maguire, The Times Literary Supplement)
T. M. Scanlon's new book is essential reading for anybody interested in metaethics and practical rationality. (Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter, Ethics)
a much needed challenge to all forms of non-cognitivism. (Bruce Russell, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)
Scanlon delivers new insights and develops new ways of thinking about normative claims. His book thereby introduces engaging ways of discussing normative theory that should be further developed and brought to bear on actual discussions. As such Being Realistic about Reasons shows us an independent thinker outlining his current thinking about normative claims. His book is a challenge to all non-cognitivist theories of moral thinking and proponents who try to interpret moral terms in naturalistic terms such as "water" and the likes. Hopefully it will be taken on. (Metapsychology Reviews Online)
T. M. Scanlon is a towering figure in moral and political philosophy ... Throughout, this new book reveals the impressive creative intelligence that always characterizes Scanlon's work. It is an important work, which all metaethicists will have to come to grips with, since it defends a distinctive position about these central metaethical questions. (Ralph Wedgwood, The Philosophical Quarterly)
intelligent and candid book (A. W. Price, Mind)
Reseña del editor
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism―the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
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- EditorialOUP Oxford
- Año de publicación2014
- ISBN 10 0199678480
- ISBN 13 9780199678488
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- IdiomaInglés
- Número de páginas144
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Being Realistic about Reasons
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief.Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflectiveequilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense ofnormative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers aninterpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium. Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780199678488
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Being Realistic About Reasons
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Condición: New. Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism-the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action. Num Pages: 144 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPM; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 223 x 136 x 15. Weight in Grams: 290. . 2014. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . Nº de ref. del artículo: V9780199678488
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