In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesaña argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesaña calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesaña embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña's own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
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Juan Comesaña is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Prior to this, he obtained his PhD from Brown University and then taught at the University of Wisconsin, Madison for six years. He works mainly in epistemology, though he is also interested in metaphysics and metaethics.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesana argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesana provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesana calls "Experientialism," differs fromthe two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialismfares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesana embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesana's own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism. Juan Comesana presents a new framework for understanding the rationality of action and belief, which he calls "Experientalism". Arguing that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief, Comesana provides a novel account of empirical evidence as consisting of the content of undefeated experiences. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780198847717
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