Law and Social Norms - Tapa dura

Posner, in seeking to establish the central importance of what he calls 'social norms, ' gives the example of Christmas fruit cake: People bake fruit cakes, exchange them and sometimes try to eat them. No law requires this. And few enjoy it (as Posner stipulates). Yet people still manufacture them; such, Posner concludes, is the power of social norms which function as signals that players have won an advantage in the competitive 'game' of life...[Posner's] book concludes that social norms have evolved as arbitrarily as peacock's tails have, and with much the same purpose--to signal their holders' desirability as partners for strategic cooperation. Failure to conform to social norms reveals unreliability, even though--or, more precisely, because--such norms are fundamentally arbitrary and costly to maintain."--M.N.S. Sellers "Washington Post "

What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and non-legal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing co-operative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behaviour. The resulting behavioural patterns are called social norms. Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involves the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and non-profit organisations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: would the legalisation of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? is it beneficial to shame criminals? why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? would people vote more if non-voters were penalised? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader.