adler nathaniel diaz rafael goldstein (1 resultados)

Wraps. Condición: Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [2], 33, [1] pages. Illustrations. Sources of Figures and Tables. Endnotes. Appendix lists Interviews and Personal Presentations. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This report is the product of research conducted during the Fall of 2010, by a team of graduate students from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and School of Engineering and Applied Science. Team members traveled to South Korea, China, and Japan where they interviewed elected and appointed government officials, academics, scientists, and members of nongovernmental organizations. The group also conducted research in the United States, including interviews with experts on nuclear fuel cycle issues, and discussions with officials from the United States Government. Most officials spoke candidly about sensitive issues on the condition that their comments remain off the record. In accordance with their wishes, attribution of opinions and insights has been restricted where necessary. South Korea, China, and Japan all have near-term plans to embark upon or expand on closed nuclear fuel cycles - including spent fuel reprocessing and fast breeder reactor (FBR) development. The core reprocessing supporters in each country are government nuclear energy research and development (R&D) labs focused on the closed fuel cycle's promises of access to "domestic" fuel resources and the hope of reduced waste volume. However, these efforts pose real proliferation dangers by expanding access to weapon usable plutonium. Asia is also emerging as a major center of the nuclear power industry. China, Japan, and South Korea all have ambitious light water nuclear reactor (LWR) construction programs, driven by concerns about over-dependence on imported fossil fuels and increasingly by fears of global warming as well. Expanded reprocessing efforts in these three countries could therefore shift accepted norms both regionally, and globally, toward a closed fuel cycle. We propose the following overarching policy conclusions for facilitating the development of nuclear energy in East Asia and for preserving the strongest possible barriers to the proliferation of fissile material: 1) Broaden multinational R&D efforts relating to all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. 2) Establish an international effort to investigate and formulate best practices for public safety and for participation in nuclear waste repository siting. 3) Continue exploring possibilities for siting international long-term spent fuel storage facilities or repositories. The existence of an international or regional spent fuel storage facility could be a powerful argument against Japan and South Korea's view that reprocessing is the only solution to their domestic spent-fuel storage problems. The US has consent rights over the disposition of much of the spent fuel in these two countries. The recently approved 123 agreement between the US and Russia may make it possible to discuss Russia's interest in hosting an international spent fuel storage site. In addition to these overarching conclusions, we have country-level policy recommendations for South Korea, China, and Japan that could be pursued in support of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.