Limiting Risk in America's Wars: Airpower, Asymmetrics, and a New Strategic Paradigm (Transforming War Series) - Tapa dura

"Phillip Meilinger deftly points out the expensive repetitive way that the United States has managed to develop the finest military forces in history, and then proceeded to misuse them shamefully. The author's comprehensive grasp of military strategy, politics, and national characteristics enable him to explain the general failure of U.S. diplomacy across the globe." - Walter J. Boyne, former Director of the National Air and Space Museum "The author, in his thoughtful analysis of post-war conflicts, asserts that the nature of war has changed in recent decades.... Recommended." --Aerospace "This is the sort of book we need to help continue the discussion of how the United States should be engaging in the world. The Air Force is currently developing its next generation bomber which will incorporate the latest in stealth, propulsion, and information technology. At the same time, it is exploring a relatively simple light-attack platform for use in smaller conflicts. These cost money, and the more we discuss what we are trying to accomplish and what systems are required, the better prepared we'll be. This book is a valuable addition to that discussion." --The Free Library "[T]his is a book about US strategy, or rather re-thinking US strategy in the context of protecting national interests subject to the usual pressures of representative democracy... [T]he book is easy to read and understand." --From Balloons to Drones "For decades, adherents of the Clausewitzian enshrinement of battle and destruction have directed most American wars--with disastrous and unsustainable consequences. Colonel Meilinger employs a wide range of historical examples to argue persuasively that it is time to rethink basic strategy, capitalize on the asymmetric capabilities of airpower, and undertake wars only when clear and attainable objectives are balanced with smart risk and cost calculations. An important read for the US defense establishment!" - -- Col. John Warden, USAF (Ret.), author of The Air Campaign, co-author of Winning in FastTime, and president of Venturist, Inc. "Phil Meilinger explodes myths and offers new ways to think about the conduct of war. His skillful blending of historical and operational context, proper analysis, and insight into the airpower profession itself makes this timely and in many ways controversial book a must-read for anyone interested in contemporary warfare. It is fascinating, creative and highly enlightening." - Colonel John Andreas Olsen, Royal Norwegian Air Force, author of Airpower Applied "Dr. Meilinger, one of the leading lights in air power doctrine and theory, focuses on how the United States could use its advantages in air power to achieve national security goals at lower risk and cost. This important work helps illuminate new approaches to the application of US military power in future conflicts." --Christopher J. Bowie, Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center

The United States has the most expensive and seemingly military forces in the world. Yet, since World War II its military success rate has been fairly meager. The Korean War was a draw, Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include: Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. The vital interests of the United States are seldom at stake; instead, the US intervenes to punish aggressors or topple particularly inhumane dictators. As a result, the US and its allies strive to maintain public support, both at home and abroad. One of the surest ways to lose this support is to suffer high casualties or, worse, inflict them on the societies we are ostensibly attempting to help. The goal of limiting cost and casualties is hindered by the introduction of large numbers of conventional ground troops-especially in the xenophobic societies of the Middle East. This desire to limit risk and cost, while still achieving definable political goals, results in a quandary. This is not a new problem, and as early as two millennia ago nations sought to achieve these dual and often contradictory goals against enemies with asymmetric strengths. Often, nations rejected taking on a powerful enemy head-to-head; instead, belligerents launched "second front operations"-they moved the war elsewhere to achieve local superiority. Not surprisingly, this strategy was especially appealing to nations possessing powerful navies. Britain, who controlled the seas for several centuries, was especially adept at using this "second front" strategy. Today we find that although second fronts may not be necessary, the reasons for conducting such operations are still with us-the desire to limit risk while achieving measurable goals. For America that means eschewing the use of massive numbers of ground troops to invade and occupy a subject country, but instead using its asymmetric strengths-a combination of airpower, SOF, intelligence and indigenous ground troops to achieve political goals.