Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (IMF's Occasional Papers) - Tapa blanda

In recent decades, most industrial countries have seen a sharp rise in the size of government and a large accumulation of public debt. An increasing number of countries have adopted formal fiscal rules to deal with high public debt levels, such as balanced-budget rules or multiyear frameworks that limit discretionary fiscal policy. This paper studies the design of fiscal rules and frameworks, focusing on the experiences in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit by more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.