Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia - Tapa blanda

This monograph in our series on “Building Regional Security in the Western Hemisphere” includes three presentations that were made at the March 2003 conference in Miami. They include a high ranking Argentine diplomat, a leading Brazilian scholar, and a retired Colombian general officer. As might be expected, these individuals perceive the need for regional security cooperation from somewhat different perspectives. Yet, despite their differences, these writers express some significant common perceptions. First, none of them offers a panacea or quick fix solution to the regional stability-security issue--or even suggests that any short-term solution is possible. That judgment is important as the United States focuses on the need to develop a realistic ends, ways, and means stability strategy to begin the implementation of a viable Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. Second, implicitly at least, each supports the idea that even though there is no traditional military threat from external enemies, “new” threats are present that must be addressed. As an example, they agreed that the terrorist threat requires close regional coordination, and that it dictates the need to enhance multilateral cooperation. But as Ambassador Delgado points out, “We [must start] thinking of ways of joining efforts and scarce resources for the benefit of our common welfare. . . . We should not forget that the priorities of millions of Latin Americans pass through their struggle to feed themselves and their families . . . and to solve the increase in public insecurity and crime that plagues their daily lives . . . Doing so should not be incompatible to fighting terrorism at the same time.” This is a sensible and pragmatic approach. In that connection, all three agreed that there is a lack of a common view regarding precisely “What is a threat?” and “What is security?” This is the heart of the stability problem in Latin America. These authors acknowledge that the traditional definition of security and threat is no longer completely valid. They understand that a more realistic concept includes the protection of national sovereignty against unconventional internal causes and attackers. They also recognize that a close linkage exists among security, development, and democracy. Nevertheless, with the exception of General Medina, they were reluctant to take a broadened definition of national security to its logical conclusion. That is, to correspondingly broaden and integrate the roles of the national security forces into an internal sovereignty protection mission. Colombians now understand that that role is what makes stability, development, and democracy possible. Finally, all three are at least implicitly aware of the inability of individual Latin American nations to keep the Colombian crisis contained within Colombia. They acknowledged that significant spillover into Colombia’s neighbors is occurring, and that it can only increase. That understanding, plus an acknowledged need to give more attention to political, economic, and social issues that have a bearing on the regional security situation, return us to the first points of this discussion. It takes us to the need for a hemispheric architecture that can deal cooperatively and effectively with the insecurity and instability threats that have meaning for us all. The security-stability equation in Latin America is extremely volatile and dangerous. In terms of the kind of environment that is essential to the entire North American strategy for the hemisphere, that stability situation is deserving of much more attention than it has had in the recent past. If the reader has not already been thinking about these issues, this monograph is a good place to start. If the reader has been considering these problems, this monograph provides a point from which to recapitulate.