The Doctrine of Judicial Review: Its Legal and Historical Basis and Other Essays - Tapa blanda

-Professor Corwin's method of discussing legal problems is a happy combination of logical analysis and the appeal to history.- --Thomas Reed Powell, Columbia Law Review -[This book] is a historical research into the power of courts to disregard and declare of no effect acts passed by legislatures in excess of their constitutional authority. . . . We commend the book to all who may be interested in the history of one of the most important powers of the United States Supreme Court.- --H. W. A., Yale Law Journal -This volume consists of five essays. . . obviously interesting to lawyers; but the volume is not peculiarly addressed to them, for, as the author is a professor of history, the point of view is historical and not legal.- --Harvard Law Review -The discussions are interesting and readable.- --H. W. B., University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register -At a time when the American public is beginning to show impatience with a judicial assumption almost unknown in other constitutionally-governed countries, this exposition has especial interest. . . . The purpose of the book is to answer the question, 'What is the exact legal basis of the power of the supreme court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress?' Dr. Corwin is not satisfied with what were merely the hopes of the framers, but seeks what they understood to be incorporated in the constitution for the purpose of establishing judicial review. . . . [Corwin] is driven to the conclusion that judicial review was rested by the framers 'upon certain general principles which in their estimation made specific provision for it unnecessary.'- --Charles H. Maxson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science -[T]he. . . convincing portions of his work in this book and others are those in which he, taking a somewhat larger view of cases, and bringing to bear upon them his wide historical knowledge, reaches conclusions which evidently are going into the formation of a strong and able presentation of a nationalistic theory of our government and its constitutional law.- --H. M. B., Michigan Law Review "Professor Corwin's method of discussing legal problems is a happy combination of logical analysis and the appeal to history." --Thomas Reed Powell, Columbia Law Review "[This book] is a historical research into the power of courts to disregard and declare of no effect acts passed by legislatures in excess of their constitutional authority. . . . We commend the book to all who may be interested in the history of one of the most important powers of the United States Supreme Court." --H. W. A., Yale Law Journal "This volume consists of five essays. . . obviously interesting to lawyers; but the volume is not peculiarly addressed to them, for, as the author is a professor of history, the point of view is historical and not legal." --Harvard Law Review "The discussions are interesting and readable." --H. W. B., University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register "At a time when the American public is beginning to show impatience with a judicial assumption almost unknown in other constitutionally-governed countries, this exposition has especial interest. . . . The purpose of the book is to answer the question, 'What is the exact legal basis of the power of the supreme court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress?' Dr. Corwin is not satisfied with what were merely the hopes of the framers, but seeks what they understood to be incorporated in the constitution for the purpose of establishing judicial review. . . . [Corwin] is driven to the conclusion that judicial review was rested by the framers 'upon certain general principles which in their estimation made specific provision for it unnecessary.'" --Charles H. Maxson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science "[T]he. . . convincing portions of his work in this book and others are those in which he, taking a somewhat larger view of cases, and bringing to bear upon them his wide historical knowledge, reaches conclusions which evidently are going into the formation of a strong and able presentation of a nationalistic theory of our government and its constitutional law." --H. M. B., Michigan Law Review "Professor Corwin's method of discussing legal problems is a happy combination of logical analysis and the appeal to history." --Thomas Reed Powell, Columbia Law Review "[This book] is a historical research into the power of courts to disregard and declare of no effect acts passed by legislatures in excess of their constitutional authority. . . . We commend the book to all who may be interested in the history of one of the most important powers of the United States Supreme Court." --H. W. A., Yale Law Journal "This volume consists of five essays. . . obviously interesting to lawyers; but the volume is not peculiarly addressed to them, for, as the author is a professor of history, the point of view is historical and not legal." --Harvard Law Review "The discussions are interesting and readable." --H. W. B., University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register "At a time when the American public is beginning to show impatience with a judicial assumption almost unknown in other constitutionally-governed countries, this exposition has especial interest. . . . The purpose of the book is to answer the question, 'What is the exact legal basis of the power of the supreme court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress?' Dr. Corwin is not satisfied with what were merely the hopes of the framers, but seeks what they understood to be incorporated in the constitution for the purpose of establishing judicial review. . . . [Corwin] is driven to the conclusion that judicial review was rested by the framers 'upon certain general principles which in their estimation made specific provision for it unnecessary.'" --Charles H. Maxson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science "[T]he. . . convincing portions of his work in this book and others are those in which he, taking a somewhat larger view of cases, and bringing to bear upon them his wide historical knowledge, reaches conclusions which evidently are going into the formation of a strong and able presentation of a nationalistic theory of our government and its constitutional law." --H. M. B., Michigan Law Review