The Nature of Scientific Thinking: On Interpretation, Explanation, and Understanding - Tapa dura

“The Nature of Scientific Thinking provides a valuable resource both for those who share his basic strategy–who will find many topics to take up–and for those who do not–who will be able to identify where disagreement stems from. ... provides a stimulating framework for thinking about these questions. It should be of interest both to those who tackle questions related to explanation from pragmatic approaches and to those working within formal-logical or ontic approaches.” (Lina Jansson, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29 (2), 2015)

In sum, The Nature of Scientific Thinking offers a wide-ranging perspective on the natural sciences. Faye presents his views in discussion with existing accounts of explanation, understanding, representation and interpretation, and illustrates his theses with many detailed examples from a variety of disciplines.

-Henk W. de Regt, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

The book is very readable and informative and contains stimulating ideas. But the most valuable aspect is the convincing way in which the author argues in favour of a contextual-rhetorical approach to explanation.

-Xavier de Donato Rodríguez, Metascience

There is much to praise in Faye's book, especially his facility with examples from various sciences, including physics, biology, and zoology. He masterfully keeps within the parameters of his argument regarding scientific explanation without expanding his range too widely.

-Mark Tschaepe, Philosophy in Review

For a long time philosophers and scientists have wrestled with explanatory and representational questions such as what can be considered the right form of explanation, what makes something explanatory, and how does a representation by which one explains connect to the world. Therefore explanation and representation are some of the most debated concepts that characterize scientific thinking; yet, there is little consensus among specialists on how explanation and representation in a scientific context should be described. The author argues that issues of explanations and representations must be approached according to their pragmatic roles in a scientific practice of providing understanding. He sees understanding as different from knowledge as an organization of beliefs, a capacity that human beings partly have inherited through biological evolution, partly learned through reflective thinking. However, assumptions expressing these beliefs are claimed to be explanatory not because they are true, but because they fit a rhetorical scheme of communication. Thus, the book becomes a study in naturalism and scientific pluralism.