Germ Gambits: The Bioweapons Dilemma, Iraq and Beyond (Stanford Security Studies) - Tapa blanda

"The Biological Weapons Convention crucially lacks means of ensuring that State Parties are in compliance. Using empirical evidence from the investigation of Iraq's biological weapons program, this book provides evidence that verification of the Convention could be effectively strengthened. It should be required reading for all involved with the Convention." -- Malcolm Dando, Professor of International Security "Those who wonder why veteran Iraq hands wrongly believed that Saddam Hussein was concealing weapons of mass destruction in 2003 should read Smithson's riveting account of UN weapons inspectors struggling to find out the truth after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War . . . Smithson reveals just how much work it takes to verify disarmament in the face of lying regimes and stresses the need for individual scientists to accept full responsibility when dealing with deadly material and processes." -- Lawrence D. Freedman "[Smithson] does an excellent job of explaining the complex scientific and technical issues that the inspectors had to confront, and she does so in a way that non-experts can readily grasp." -- Michael Moodie * Arms Control Today * "Smithson warns that global leaders are often quick to warn on biological hazards-terrorism, warfare, and laboratory mishaps-yet fail to follow up their rhetoric with action. This December diplomats will attend the Seventh Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva. A copy of Smithson's book should be mandatory reading for everyone who participates." -- David E. Hoffman * The Nonproliferation Review *

This book tells the tale of how international inspectors beat incredible odds to unveil Iraq's covert bioweapons program, draws lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, places the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and makes recommendations to reduce those perils.