Moral Visions: Introduction to Metaethics - Tapa dura

During the last 50 years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one, arguing that, since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been challenged by moral realists who maintain that there are moral facts; they claim that there is a truth of the matter in ethics, which is independent of our views, and which we seek to discover. Much of this debate found in the work of McDowell, Wiggins, Putnam, Blackburn and others is not easily accessible to undergraduates. This work presents many of the major issues in ethics by way of an exposition of both sides of this argument and assumes no prior knowledge of philosophy. Topics discussed include moral observation, moral motivation, amoralism and wickedness, moral weakness, cultural relativism and utilitarianism. The book concludes that a convincing case can be made out for a radical form of moral realism in which moral virtue is found, not in the following of correct moral principles, but rather in the development of moral sensitivity.