The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It: 208 (Contributions in Military Studies) - Tapa dura

"A new generation of Army officers is evaluating the lessons of America's most divisive foreign war, and both the Army and the nation will benefit. Toczek's book deserves a wide audience."-Military Review "[a] worthy contribution to the literature on the war."-Infantry "Toczek has covered all the bases here. It is unlikely that anyone need write another book about the battle of Ap Bac."-The Journal of Military History "David M. Toczek, a serving U.S. Army major, has produced the most detailed account of the battle of Ap Bac, and its presumed antecedents, that we are likely to get for a good long time."-Army History " a worthy contribution to the literature on the war."-Infantry ?Recommended?- Indochina Chronology ?[a] worthy contribution to the literature on the war.?-Infantry ?Toczek has covered all the bases here. It is unlikely that anyone need write another book about the battle of Ap Bac.?-The Journal of Military History ?David M. Toczek, a serving U.S. Army major, has produced the most detailed account of the battle of Ap Bac, and its presumed antecedents, that we are likely to get for a good long time.?-Army History ?A new generation of Army officers is evaluating the lessons of America's most divisive foreign war, and both the Army and the nation will benefit. Toczek's book deserves a wide audience.?-Military Review "Toczek's examination of the battle and his critique of its aftermath constitute a first-rate contribution to the literature of the war. The work is fresh, imaginative, revisionist. It is one of a new generation of works that will redefine our understanding of the Vietnam War."-James R. Reckner, Ph.D. Director, The Vietnam Center Texas Tech University "Major Toczek has produced the definitive study and analysis of the battle of Ap Bac. In doing so, he has made a signal contribution to the record of American involvement in Vietnam during the 1950-1965 time frame. The Battle of Ap Bac supplies an opportunity to rethink, relearn and, when appropriate, to act on the lessons provided by the battle."-Gen. W.B. Rosson, U.S. Army (Retired) Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1969-1970) "The battle of Ap Bac turned out to be the first of the big ones' in the Vietnam War. It was not so recognized at the time. Worse, for historical purposes, it was reported by trio of young journalists, (rather than war correspondents) who applied a domestic political spin largely unrelated to what had taken place on the battlefield. There it lay, encrusted in myth, for 25 years. Then David Toczek unearthed battle events and gave Ap Bac a true scholarly examination. The result is a fine piece of military history writing."-Douglas Pike Associate Director of Research, The Vietnam Center "This is above all a first-rate operational analysis of the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac, where the South Vietnamese defeat was a crucial signpost to the escalation and Americanization of the Vietnam War. In wider contexts the book shows that the Diem government of South Vietnam did have a strategy of its own, and at least the beginnings of an operational doctrine to implement that strategy. South Vietnam's immediate problems were at the tactical level. The army's force-to-mission ratios were low given its poor training and command, in that context, Toczek makes a point too often overlooked. The U.S. initiated a technowar' at this period less from abstract confidence in machines than to provide some of the force multipliers that were necessary to give ARVN a chance against an enemy with superior fighting power.'"-Dennis E. Showalter, Ph.D. Professor of History Colorado College "In Toczek's capable narrative of the 1963 fight at Ap Bac the reader will find all of the reasons for the failure of the United States military policy of advice and support in South Vietnam, and thus for South Vietnam's failure to eliminate the Communist insurgency. His signal accomplishments are to place the battle in its historical and operational context, to properly stress the role of the advisory team in relation to the unit advised, and to illuminate the formidable situational constraints endured by American advisors. Toczek's book should be read by military professionals and all others who wish to separate the pitfalls from the potential when they study how to fight insurgents, guerrillas, and irregular forces in the post Cold War world."-John M. Carland, Ph.D. author of Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, a volume in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series.

Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.