The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford Constitutional Theory) - Tapa blanda

The Global Model of Constitutional Rights is a must-read for all those interested in the moral justification of human rights law and constitutional theory. Its highly accessible language will make it readable for students and seasoned academics alike. ... Also an attractive read for those political and legal theorists who wish to continue exploring the liberal preoccupation with how to enhance individual freedom. (John Adenitire, Human Rights Law Review)

Intricate, meticulously argued and balanced, the book confidently straddles moral philosophy and constitutional theory ... Moller's book comes at a crucial juncture in the global debate on constitutionalism and makes a distinguished contribution to it. (Dimitrios Kyritsis, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies)

By the end of the book, one cannot but admire the wide spread of Moller's net and the fine weaving that integrates the whole of constitutional rights, reasoning, and politics. The project comes out as integrative, monistic, and foundationalist simultaneously. (Pritam Baruah, Modern Law Review)

Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional rights has had remarkable success, first in Europe and now globally. This global model of constitutional rights is characterized by an extremely broad approach to the scope of rights (sometimes referred to as 'rights inflation'), the acceptance of horizontal effect of rights, positive obligations, and increasingly also socio-economic rights, and the use of the doctrines of balancing and proportionality to determine the permissible limitations of rights.

Drawing on analyses of a broad range of cases from the UK, the European Court of Human Rights, Germany, Canada, the US, and South Africa, this book provides the first substantive moral, reconstructive theory of the global model. It shows that it is based on a coherent conception of constitutional rights which connects to attractive accounts of judicial review, democracy and the separation of powers.

The first part of the book develops a theory of the scope of rights under the global model. It defends the idea of a general right to personal autonomy; a right to everything which, according to the agent's self-conception, is in his or her interest. The function of this right is to acknowledge that every act by a public authority which places a burden on a person's autonomy requires justification. The book concludes by demonstrating a theory of the structure of this justification which offers original and useful accounts of the important doctrines of balancing and proportionality.