The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics (Oxford Moral Theory) - Tapa blanda

Väyrynen provides a thorough and genuinely readable introduction to the philosophical significance of thick concepts, their relation to thin concepts and the separability of their components. He tells us (in a fashion that does justice to the ambitions of his predecessors)

[This book is] not just good, but superb. (Matthew S. Bedke, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

Using the resources of linguistics and the philosophy of language, [Vayrynen] provides a cautious and thorough analysis f how thick terms function in the communicative enterprise. The result is a novel view of the evaluative contents of thick terms and concepts that dislodges them from the semantic content. Vayrynen's analysis undermines much of the philosophical significance historically attributed to thick terms. Consequently, it will be necessary reading for anyone working with the 'thick' in ethics or in the philosophy of language. Highly recommended. (A.L. Morton, CHOICE)

"...articulates and defends a novel view of thick concepts extremely carefully and rigorously...makes considerable advances not only in the thick concepts debate but in metaethics and metanormative philosophy in general. " -Debbie Roberts, Ethics

In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick concepts, Pekka Vayrynen argues that all this is mistaken. Through detailed attention to the language of thick concepts, he defends a novel theory on which the relationship between thick words and evaluation is best explained by general conversational and pragmatic norms. Drawing on general principles in philosophy of language, he argues that many prominent features of thick words and concepts can be explained by general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. If evaluation is not essential to the sort of thinking we do with thick concepts, claims for the deep and distinctive significance of the thick are undermined. TheLewd, the Rude and the Nasty is a fresh and innovative treatment of an important topic in moral philosophy and sets a new agenda for future work. It will be essential reading to anyone interested in the analysis and the broader philosophical significance of evaluative and normative language.