TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES (The Locke Institute series) - Tapa dura

`The authors provide a useful and informative examination of the public choice view on trade policy.' -- Douglas A. Irwin, Journal of Economic History `This impressive treatise provides critical new insights into trade policies since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The authors carefully and systematically analyze the behavior of the major players in the formation of trade policies, namely, common interest groups in the private sector, the House and Senate, the President, and the government bureaucracy, in most of the major episodes of trade-policy change over these years and show how the outcomes can be best understood within a political economy framework. Their final conclusion that unilateral free trade should be imposed by amending the Constitution to prevent the government from levying import duties or imposing quantitative restrictions on trade should stimulate a fundamental rethinking of US trade policy.' -- Robert E. Baldwin, University of Wisconsin, US `The Locke Institute captured top honors for the third consecutive year with its nomination, Trade Protection in the United States. Authors Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke, and Richard E. Wagner make an "incontrovertible case" for free trade irrespective of the trade policies pursued by other countries.' -- Atlas Economic Research Foundation Highlights, Spring 1996 `. . . I find this book to be a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the endogeneity of trade policy.' -- Howard J. Wall, The Economic Journal

Trade policy in the United States since 1930 is rigorously evaluated in this major new book. Using public choice analysis to identify and explain protectionist behavior, Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E. Wagner demonstrate why unilateral free trade cannot be achieved through the normal political process and make a strong case for constitutional reform. Trade Protection in the United States analyzes the history of US trade policy to explain why interest groups are able to foster protectionist policies despite the advantages which free trade offers consumers. The authors also explain why the principles of managed trade - as epitomized in the institution of the GATT - are inevitably subverted by protectionism. This important book concludes with a vigorous justification of unilateral free trade and makes a convincing case for protecting the freedom to trade through an amendment to the US constitution. Applying recent developments in constitutional political economy to a key policy issue, this book will be welcomed by economists, political scientists and lawyers as a major statement of the right to trade.