Chilcot Report: Executive Summary - Tapa blanda

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.
Philippe Sands, London Review of Books 

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

Derek B. Miller, The Guardian
 

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry
by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...'
Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books

Ordered in 2009 by the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, the Chilcot Report is the official verdict on Britain's conduct before, during and after the Iraq war in 2003.

Named after its chairman Sir John Chilcot, a retired civil servant, the committee - formally the Iraq Inquiry - reported its findings on 6th July 2016.

It damned the handling of the war by the government of prime minister Tony Blair.

Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books:

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

The report deals with:

*Iraq's threat to Britain;

*legal advice for the invasion;

*intelligence about weapons of mass destruction; and

*planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to bring to a wider audience the findings of a public inquiry which took seven years and cost the British taxpayer more than £10 million.

It has been designed to provide a superior reading experience to the official report: the typeface and spacing are different to the official report; however the text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.

CONTENTS

Introduction.

Pre-conflict strategy and planning.

The UK decision to support US military action.

Why Iraq? Why now?

The UK's relationship with the US.

Decision-making.

Advice on the legal basis for military action.

Weapons of mass destruction.

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

The post-conflict period.

Occupation.

Transition.

Planning for withdrawal.

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

Key findings.

Lessons

Timeline of events

Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.