British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 5, Strategic Deception - Tapa dura

'What was lacking was a definitive study ... This void has been fulfilled by ... British Intelligence in the Second World War, written by one of this century's most distinguished military historians, Sir Michael Howard ... What has been less well known have been the actual details, a task that Howard tackles with his accustomed authoritative style, laying out both process and substance of these efforts as well as the degree to which each contributed to the conclusion of the European war.' Air Power Journal

' ... a valuable addition to any library on World War II and a must read for anyone interested in understanding the intellegence contribution to deception efforts in that war.' Military Review

'Howard writes with his customary skill, clarity, and conciseness, documenting the intricate machinery created to ensure an integrated campaign that brought together the civilians and the military involved in the delicate task of deception, analysing its effect on the major theatres of war, and giving individual credit where credit is due.' The International History Review

' ... authoritative analysis and assessment of strategic deception, especially in the Mediterranean and Western Europe.' Thomas F. Troy, The Washington Post

'Anyone who likes a good spy story but has doubts about the value of historians rummaging around in archives should look at the magisterial five-volume official history British Intelligence in the Second World War produced by a team of scholars under the distinguished historian Harry Hinsley. Of particular interest is Michael Howard's slim but brilliant final volume, dealing with strategic deception.' New York Times Book Review

'As one would expect from Howard, it is a superbly written narrative history ...' David Curtis Skaggs, Journal of Military History

Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. It complements Volume 4 which describes the activities of Nazi agents who had been persuaded to work for the Allies by considering how their work for the Allied side was turned to direct military advantage. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions. The fourth described the high level of security achieved within the United Kingdom. Volume 5 explains how this combination of intelligence and security made it possible to deceive the enemy about the strategic intentions of the Allies, and make them greatly overestimate the resources at their disposal. The authoritative story of such classic deception operations as Operation Mincemeat, which preceded the invasion of Sicily; of the non-existent U.S. Army group that pinned down an entire German Army in the Pas de Calais until Montgomery's forces had achieved a secure foothold in Normandy; and the amazing spoof played on the German intelligence authorities by the great double agent GARBO is at last told from official records.