Publicado por Popular Magazine Pub, 1967
Librería: Comic World, Steinbach, MB, Canada
Original o primera edición
EUR 10,59
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoSoft cover. Condición: Fair to Good, Reading Copy. Dust Jacket Included. Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey Ilustrador. ARGOSY Men Adventure Magazine Volume 364, #4 (April /1967; Popular Publications;) Painted Front Cover : Norman Adams 134 pages including covers; Writers: Brett Halliday; Martin Deutsch; Lew Louderback; Robert Joseph Allen; Peter Michelmore; David Ash; Gil Paust; Lord Kilbracken; Lowell Thomas; C. S. Forester; S. K. Snedegar; Milt Machlin; Jack Fields; Harry Steeger; Eric Nyborg; Gene Lowall; Hal Steeger; Bruce Cassiday; George Laycock; J. Edward Schipper; Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey; *** Book Order # ADV166; Condition= FA/G = (1.5) FAIR to GOOD; (Well Used / LOW GRADE Worn Reading Copy) Paper pull on front cover Price=US$12.00); Size: 4to - over 9¾" - 12" tall TRUE FIRST Edition MAGAZINE Format Thus. Book.
Publicado por Popular Magazine Pub, 1967
Librería: Comic World, Steinbach, MB, Canada
Original o primera edición
EUR 13,24
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoSoft cover. Condición: GOOD+. Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey Ilustrador. ARGOSY Men Adventure Magazine Volume 364, #4 (April /1967; Popular Publications;) Painted Front Cover : Norman Adams 134 pages including covers; Writers: Brett Halliday; Martin Deutsch; Lew Louderback; Robert Joseph Allen; Peter Michelmore; David Ash; Gil Paust; Lord Kilbracken; Lowell Thomas; C. S. Forester; S. K. Snedegar; Milt Machlin; Jack Fields; Harry Steeger; Eric Nyborg; Gene Lowall; Hal Steeger; Bruce Cassiday; George Laycock; J. Edward Schipper; Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey; *** Book Order # ADV166-2; >> Dust shadow along 3 edges of forn tocver; mailing label to frotn cover; Size: 4to - over 9¾" - 12" tall TRUE FIRST Edition MAGAZINE Format Thus. Book.
Publicado por Academic Journal Offprint from: - Journal for the History of Astronomy, Supplement to Volume 29, No. 23, 1998., 1998
Librería: Nar Valley Books & Prints, King's Lynn, Reino Unido
EUR 7,87
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carrito8pp, figs, Printed Card Cover, VGC,
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 72,40
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 75,05
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
EUR 69,41
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. In.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, GB, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino Unido
EUR 84,15
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 70,57
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 94,99
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 77,85
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
EUR 96,65
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. In.
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 111,58
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 112,22
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. 160.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press(UK), 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
EUR 102,79
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . .
Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 120,00
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 117,96
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Librería: Chapter 1, Johannesburg, GAU, Sur Africa
Original o primera edición Ejemplar firmado
EUR 105,88
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. First Edition. Signed and inscribed by the author Keith Snedegar. Publication of 189 pages. The Pictorial boards are in near fine condition. Internally the pages are clean and complete. The text is legible. The binding is excellent. GK. Our orders are shipped using tracked courier delivery services. Signed.
EUR 114,86
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Brand New. 149 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 126,92
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 115,91
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press(UK), 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 128,08
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 127,78
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, GB, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Reino Unido
EUR 78,85
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 176,41
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. 218.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 174,12
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Brand New. 189 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 74,74
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
EUR 73,29
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
EUR 73,50
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Reino Unido
EUR 82,27
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino Unido
EUR 77,54
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.