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Robust Mechanism Design: The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

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ISBN 10: 981437458X / ISBN 13: 9789814374583
Editorial: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
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Descripción

BRAND NEW, Robust Mechanism Design: The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction. N° de ref. de la librería B9789814374583

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Detalles bibliográficos

Título: Robust Mechanism Design: The Role of Private...

Editorial: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd

Encuadernación: Hardback

Condición del libro: new

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Sinopsis:

This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.

The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

About the Author:

Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass and Marian Campbell Professor of Economics at Yale University. Professor Bergemann received his PhD in Economics under the supervision of Professor George Mailath from the University of Pennsylvania in 1994.

He has been affiliated with the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale since 1996 and he is also a Fellow of the Econometric Society and the European Economic Association. His research is in game theory, contract theory and mechanism design and has been widely published in the leading economic journals, among others in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy and Review of Economic Studies. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation.

Professor Bergemann is presently an editor of the Journal of the European Economic Association.

Stephen Morris is currently the Alexander Stewart 1886 Professor of Economics at Princeton University and has been on the Princeton faculty since 2005. Professor Morris received a BA in Mathematics and Economics from the University of Cambridge in 1985 and a PhD in Economics under the supervision of Professor John Geanakoplos from Yale University in 1991. He earlier taught at the University of Pennsylvania (1991-1998) and Yale University (1998-2005).

His research is in microeconomic theory, with a focus on incomplete information games and mechanism design, and with applications in finance and macroeconomics. This work has been published in leading economic journals, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies and Quarterly Journal of Economics. Professor Morris was editor of Econometrica (2007-2011) and is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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