How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Stefan Riedener, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
EUR 16,66 gastos de envío desde Estados Unidos de America a España
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoEUR 19,49 gastos de envío desde Alemania a España
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoLibrería: revreaders, Pittsboro, NC, Estados Unidos de America
Hardcover. Condición: As New. Nº de ref. del artículo: BO uv 22
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Die neue Reihe Ideen&Argumente ist dem Ideal einer pluralistischen und offenen Argumentationskultur verpflichtet und präsentiert in solider Ausstattung Themen und Fragestellungen, die inhaltlich oder methodisch wichtige Beiträge zu. Nº de ref. del artículo: 579667943
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: L1-9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9783110739572_new
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de America
HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: L1-9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. 168 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.Walter de Gruyter, Genthiner Straße 13, 10785 Berlin 168 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
Condición: New. 2021. Hardcover. . . . . . Nº de ref. del artículo: V9783110739572
Cantidad disponible: 15 disponibles
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. Nº de ref. del artículo: ABLIING23Mar3113020060172
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles