Críticas:
"Learned, beautifully written, and timely."--Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Chairman, the Mises Institute
"Grant unearths a forgotten depression to pose the iconoclastic argument that the government's best response to economic turmoil is to keep its hands off. A veteran financial writer, Grant handles abstruse issues with a light touch and a sure hand, gleaning wisdom in such unexpected figures as Charles Dawes, first director of the federal budget, and Warren G. Harding."--Charles Rappleye, author of Robert Morris and Herbert Hoover, a Biography (forthcoming)
"Are markets self-correcting? What, if any, role should government play when the Hidden Hand falters? Even as much of the world struggles through The Great Recession, James Grant offers a libertarian dissent from interventionist dogma. You don't have to agree with Grant's economics to admire the rigor of his thought, the grace of his prose, or the sweep of his argument contrasting what went right in the 1920s, and wrong in the 1930s. This is a true rarity, a first-rate work of history that is as relevant as the morning headlines."--Richard Norton Smith, author of On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller and An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover
"Grant has written an elegant history of the 1920-1921 depression."--Robert Samuelson "The Washington Post "
Reseña del editor:
By the publisher of the prestigious Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, an account of the deep economic slump of 1920–21 that proposes, with respect to federal intervention, “less is more.” This is a free-market rejoinder to the Keynesian stimulus applied by Bush and Obama to the 2007–09 recession, in whose aftereffects, Grant asserts, the nation still toils.
James Grant tells the story of America’s last governmentally-untreated depression; relatively brief and self-correcting, it gave way to the Roaring Twenties. His book appears in the fifth year of a lackluster recovery from the overmedicated downturn of 2007–2009.
In 1920–21, Woodrow Wilson and Warren G. Harding met a deep economic slump by seeming to ignore it, implementing policies that most twenty-first century economists would call backward. Confronted with plunging prices, wages, and employment, the government balanced the budget and, through the Federal Reserve, raised interest rates. No “stimulus” was administered, and a powerful, job-filled recovery was under way by late in 1921.
In 1929, the economy once again slumped—and kept right on slumping as the Hoover administration adopted the very policies that Wilson and Harding had declined to put in place. Grant argues that well-intended federal intervention, notably the White House-led campaign to prop up industrial wages, helped to turn a bad recession into America’s worst depression. He offers the experience of the earlier depression for lessons for today and the future. This is a powerful response to the prevailing notion of how to fight recession. The enterprise system is more resilient than even its friends give it credit for being, Grant demonstrates.
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