Industrial computing: Programmable logic controller, SCADA, Stuxnet, SERCOS III, Industry Foundation Classes, Fieldbus

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9781157713050: Industrial computing: Programmable logic controller, SCADA, Stuxnet, SERCOS III, Industry Foundation Classes, Fieldbus
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Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 57. Chapters: Programmable logic controller, SCADA, Stuxnet, SERCOS III, Industry Foundation Classes, Fieldbus, Real-time Control System, 4D-RCS Reference Model Architecture, Modbus, AS-Interface, Profibus, Computer-integrated manufacturing, DeviceNet, EPICS, CC-Link Industrial Networks, OpenSCADA, MTConnect, SERCOS interface, CIMOSA, Dispatcher training simulator, ORiN, Warehouse control system, TTP/A, Aggflow, Computer-aided process planning, I/Gear, AxSTREAM, RADlab Software, FOUNDATION fieldbus, LabRAD, PROFIsafe, Foundation Fieldbus H1, Data Design System, Data Transport Utility, WinCC, Fieldbus Foundation, Multi Point Interface, AMICE Consortium, The Construction Manager, Nexus Recycling Management System, Industrial USB, Welding software, Solibri Model Viewer. Excerpt: Stuxnet is a computer worm discovered in July 2010. It targets Siemens industrial software and equipment running on Microsoft Windows. While it is not the first time that crackers have targeted industrial systems, it is the first discovered malware that spies on and subverts industrial systems, and the first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit. The worm initially spreads indiscriminately, but includes a highly specialized malware payload that is designed to target only Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes. Stuxnet infects PLCs by subverting the Step-7 software application that is used to reprogram these devices. Different variants of Stuxnet targeted five Iranian organizations, with the probable target widely suspected to be uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran; Symantec noted in August 2010 that 60% of the infected computers worldwide were in Iran. Siemens stated on November 29 that the worm has not caused any damage to its customer...

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