Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

3,68 valoración promedio
( 28 valoraciones por Goodreads )
 
9780691099897: Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
Críticas:

"This is a big book and an important one. It completes a program on which George Tsebelis has been working for ten years or more. With luck, it may revolutionize the systematic study of comparative government." --Iain McLean, Journal of Legislative Studies

Reseña del editor:


Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo.


Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline.



From the preface to the Italian edition:



"Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna



"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Comprar nuevo Ver libro

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America

Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

Añadir al carrito

Los mejores resultados en AbeBooks

1.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press, United States (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
Librería
The Book Depository
(London, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press, United States, 2002. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 231 x 155 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of veto players, or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes.This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis. --Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna. Nº de ref. de la librería AAU9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 29,73
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

2.

George Tsebelis
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Cantidad: 1
Librería
Books-FYI, Inc.
(cadiz, KY, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 23MA3600YNPE

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 26,65
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 3,57
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

3.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press, United States (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
Librería
The Book Depository US
(London, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press, United States, 2002. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 231 x 155 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of veto players, or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes.This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis. --Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna. Nº de ref. de la librería AAU9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 30,31
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

4.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press 2002-09-27, Princeton, N.J. |Woodstock (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos paperback Cantidad: 10
Librería
Blackwell's
(Oxford, OX, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press 2002-09-27, Princeton, N.J. |Woodstock, 2002. paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 28,30
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 5,15
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

5.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Cantidad: 2
Librería
Books2Anywhere
(Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press, 2002. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería BB-9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 23,57
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 10,31
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

6.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 2
Librería
THE SAINT BOOKSTORE
(Southport, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press. Paperback. Estado de conservación: new. BRAND NEW, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, George Tsebelis, Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes.This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna. Nº de ref. de la librería B9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 28,38
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 6,80
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

7.

George Tsebelis
Editorial: Princeton University Press (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Tapa blanda Cantidad: 1
Librería
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press, 2002. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería EH9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 32,06
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 4,49
De Alemania a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

8.

George Tsebelis
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Cantidad: 1
Librería
Speedy Hen LLC
(Sunrise, FL, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Estado de conservación: New. Bookseller Inventory # ST0691099898. Nº de ref. de la librería ST0691099898

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 37,85
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

9.

George Tsebelis
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Cantidad: 1
Librería
BWB
(Valley Stream, NY, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Estado de conservación: New. Depending on your location, this item may ship from the US or UK. Nº de ref. de la librería 97806910998970000000

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 38,27
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

10.

Tsebelis, George
Editorial: Princeton University Press (2002)
ISBN 10: 0691099898 ISBN 13: 9780691099897
Nuevos Tapa blanda Cantidad: 1
Librería
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Princeton University Press, 2002. Estado de conservación: New. 2002. Paperback. Explains how governments are structured. This book shows why an increase in the number of 'veto players', or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Num Pages: 344 pages, 44 line illus. 16 tables. BIC Classification: JPA; JPH; JPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 234 x 156 x 23. Weight in Grams: 542. . . . . . . Nº de ref. de la librería V9780691099897

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 38,75
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Irlanda a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

Existen otras copia(s) de este libro

Ver todos los resultados de su búsqueda