Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century - Tapa dura

In this introductory text, Donald Gillies traces the development, during the 20th century, of the four central themes in the philosophy of science. The movement of ideas is placed against the background of the lives of the philosophers and of contemporary developments in science. Philosophical ideas are illustrated by accounts of important scientific discoveries. The four themes - inductivism and its critics; conventionalism and the Duhem-Quine thesis; the nature of observation; and the demarcation between science and metaphysics - have been chosen because of their central importance, and are expounded in a way that presupposes no previous knowledge of philosophy or science. "Inductivism and Its Critis" gives an account of the inductivism of the Cambridge school (Russell and Keynes) and the Vienna circle. It goes on to explain the critics of inductivism (Duhem and Popper). "Conventionalism and the Duhem-Quine Thesis" gives an exposition of Poincare's conventionalism of 1902 and Duhem's criticism of it. Duhem's thesis is then contrasted with the later thesis of Quine and its criticism. "The Nature of Observation" describes the debate between Carnap, Neurath and Popper concerning the nature of observation statements. This is then compared with Duhem's views on the question. Finally, "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics" explains the view of the early Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle that metaphysics is meaningless. It goes on to consider Popper's criticism of the Vienna circle and his defence of metaphysics, comparing it to the views of Duhem and Quine. It is argued that the Duhem-Quine thesis shows the inadequacy of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion, and suggests how this situation might be remedied. The relation of this debate to questions of science and religion is also discussed.