Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Bradford Books)

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9780262633086: Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Bradford Books)
Review:

A convincing philosophical exposition and a well-structured compendium... without a doubt, a milestone of modern Philosophy of Mind. -- Reiner Hedrich Philosophy of Science Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach opens a new path toward a scientific theory of consciousness and self-consciousness. -- Franz Mechsner and Albert Newen Science This book is a 'must' for anyone who is interested in empirical studies related to first-person issues or subjectivity. -- Kai Vogeley TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences

From the Publisher:

According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.

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Metzinger, Thomas
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd, 2004. Estado de conservación: New. 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030. . . . . . . Nº de ref. de la librería V9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd, United States (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd, United States, 2004. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 221 x 170 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a transparent self-model. In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger s central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds. Nº de ref. de la librería AAU9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd, United States (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd, United States, 2004. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 221 x 170 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a transparent self-model. In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger s central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds. Nº de ref. de la librería AAU9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press, 2004. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería BB-9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd. Estado de conservación: New. 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Nº de ref. de la librería V9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd 2004-09-07, Massachusetts (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd 2004-09-07, Massachusetts, 2004. paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780262633086

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: A Bradford Book (2004)
ISBN 10: 0262633086 ISBN 13: 9780262633086
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Descripción A Bradford Book, 2004. Estado de conservación: New. Brand New, Unread Copy in Perfect Condition. A+ Customer Service! Summary: Being No One is Kantian in its scope, intelligence and depth.Steeped in contemporary neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, the book gives the unsolved Kantianproblems of inner self and outer world a new look, a new life, and a new route to solution.Metzinger's story is understandable, compelling, and, quite simply, very, very smart. Nº de ref. de la librería ABE_book_new_0262633086

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Descripción MIT Press 2004-09-07, 2004. Estado de conservación: New. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 24-48 hours from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely. Nº de ref. de la librería NU-LBR-00753296

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Metzinger, Thomas
Editorial: MIT Press Ltd
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Descripción MIT Press Ltd. Paperback. Estado de conservación: new. BRAND NEW, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, Thomas Metzinger, According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds. Nº de ref. de la librería B9780262633086

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