Campbell Craig Destroying the Village

ISBN 13: 9780231111232

Destroying the Village

3,71 valoración promedio
( 28 valoraciones por Goodreads )
 
9780231111232: Destroying the Village

Thanks to recently declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, Craig is able to investigate what America's strategists really thought about the viability of nuclear warfare. He demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials were privately pessimistic regarding any nuclear strategy. Craig probes the heated arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, and shows how the president conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible.

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About the Author:

Campbell Craig is a lecturer in American History and Foreign Policy at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch New Zealand.

Review:

The strength of this book is its marshaling of fresh material to support a bold interpretation of an important subject. Students of the Eisenhower years will have to take note of both the book and the author. (H.W. Brands, Texas A&M University Journal of American History)

Campbell Craig does an impressive job of setting the historical record straight in his interesting and well-documented first book. (Steven W. Hook, Kent State University H-Net Reviews)

This is a highly commendable study...It will be essential reading. (Ian Jackson Journal of American Studies)

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1.

Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press, United States (1998)
ISBN 10: 0231111231 ISBN 13: 9780231111232
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
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Descripción Columbia University Press, United States, 1998. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Language: English . Brand New Book. In the early days of the Cold War, thermonuclear conflict was everywhere an imminent threat. With the realization that mutual destruction was the likely result of a nuclear war, US policy makers were forced to articulate a coherent stance on what they would do if the United States went to war with the USSR. The paradox of defeat or mutual annihilation was one that plagued American policy makers and scholars, whatever their stated position. Using declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, this text investigates what America s strategists really thought. It demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials and leading policy makers privately rejected the feasibility of any nuclear strategy. The author argues that by the late 1950s, the primary objective of the United States - though it was never voiced officially - was the avoidance of nuclear war. Craig examines the arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, showing how he conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible. The book explains how Eisenhower clashed a number of times with hardened diplomats and military officials pushing for war, in meetings that the public did not know of. This book explores in detail the various superpower disputes over Berlin and the Taiwan straits, and over NATO and the Cuban missile crisis. Nº de ref. de la librería AAH9780231111232

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Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press (1998)
ISBN 10: 0231111231 ISBN 13: 9780231111232
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Descripción Columbia University Press, 1998. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería WI-9780231111232

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Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press, United States (1998)
ISBN 10: 0231111231 ISBN 13: 9780231111232
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
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The Book Depository US
(London, Reino Unido)
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Descripción Columbia University Press, United States, 1998. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. New.. Language: English . Brand New Book. In the early days of the Cold War, thermonuclear conflict was everywhere an imminent threat. With the realization that mutual destruction was the likely result of a nuclear war, US policy makers were forced to articulate a coherent stance on what they would do if the United States went to war with the USSR. The paradox of defeat or mutual annihilation was one that plagued American policy makers and scholars, whatever their stated position. Using declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, this text investigates what America s strategists really thought. It demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials and leading policy makers privately rejected the feasibility of any nuclear strategy. The author argues that by the late 1950s, the primary objective of the United States - though it was never voiced officially - was the avoidance of nuclear war. Craig examines the arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, showing how he conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible. The book explains how Eisenhower clashed a number of times with hardened diplomats and military officials pushing for war, in meetings that the public did not know of. This book explores in detail the various superpower disputes over Berlin and the Taiwan straits, and over NATO and the Cuban missile crisis. Nº de ref. de la librería AAH9780231111232

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Craig, Campbell
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Descripción 1998. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book.Shipped from US within 10 to 14 business days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería IB-9780231111232

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Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press, United States (1998)
ISBN 10: 0231111231 ISBN 13: 9780231111232
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Book Depository hard to find
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Descripción Columbia University Press, United States, 1998. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. New.. Language: English . This book usually ship within 10-15 business days and we will endeavor to dispatch orders quicker than this where possible. Brand New Book. In the early days of the Cold War, thermonuclear conflict was everywhere an imminent threat. With the realization that mutual destruction was the likely result of a nuclear war, US policy makers were forced to articulate a coherent stance on what they would do if the United States went to war with the USSR. The paradox of defeat or mutual annihilation was one that plagued American policy makers and scholars, whatever their stated position. Using declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, this text investigates what America s strategists really thought. It demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials and leading policy makers privately rejected the feasibility of any nuclear strategy. The author argues that by the late 1950s, the primary objective of the United States - though it was never voiced officially - was the avoidance of nuclear war. Craig examines the arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, showing how he conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible. The book explains how Eisenhower clashed a number of times with hardened diplomats and military officials pushing for war, in meetings that the public did not know of. This book explores in detail the various superpower disputes over Berlin and the Taiwan straits, and over NATO and the Cuban missile crisis. Nº de ref. de la librería BTE9780231111232

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Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press 1998-07-02, New York (1998)
ISBN 10: 0231111231 ISBN 13: 9780231111232
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Descripción Columbia University Press 1998-07-02, New York, 1998. paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780231111232

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Campbell Craig
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Descripción Columbia University Press. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 2 working days. Nº de ref. de la librería B9780231111232

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Craig, Campbell
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Descripción Columbia University Press, 1998. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Never used!. Nº de ref. de la librería 0231111231

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Campbell Craig
Editorial: Columbia University Press (1998)
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Descripción Columbia University Press, 1998. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. book. Nº de ref. de la librería M0231111231

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Descripción Columbia University Press. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Paperback. 240 pages. Dimensions: 9.1in. x 6.0in. x 0.6in.Thanks to recently declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, Craig is able to investigate what Americas strategists really thought about the viability of nuclear warfare. He demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials were privately pessimistic regarding any nuclear strategy. Craig probes the heated arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, and shows how the president conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible. This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN. Paperback. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780231111232

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