Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

0 valoración promedio
( 0 valoraciones por Goodreads )
 
9780226107714: Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions.

Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state’s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems.

Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.

"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

About the Author:

Spencer D. Bakich is an associate professor of political science at the Virginia Military Institute.  He lives in Charlottesville, VA.

Review:

“This groundbreaking treatise . . . endeavors to explain America’s mixed success with limited war since 1950 by way of a new theoretical approach to analyzing policy-strategy formulation and execution at the highest levels of government. . . . With over eight hundred endnotes gleaned from more than four hundred authoritative sources, this is first and foremost a scholarly work. Those in the international relations community seeking to understand the puzzle of America’s recent strategic performance in limited wars will find this information institutions approach a worthy adjunct to the more established theories. Those who read purely for pleasure will enjoy the four case studies, each offering a unique take on the various policies and strategies crafted and the decisions made at the highest levels of government. In short, the book has much to offer, to the serious reader and dilettante alike.” (Naval War College Review)

“The book demonstrates how psychological inclinations can be checked and shaped by institutional context, as well as the idea that leaders can acquire useful information about their opponents even in the absence of costly signaling. Bakich thus presents a promising framework for thinking about policy making during limited wars as well as other endeavors where it is difficult to alleviate uncertainty.” (Aaron Rapport, University of Cambridge Perspectives on Politics)

"Recommended." (J. P. Dunn, Converse College Choice)

“Despite all the interest in preparing for short, sharp wars, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts at various operational levels, no effective conceptual basis for such conflicts has been formulated. In Success and Failure in Limited War, Bakich has taken a big step toward plugging that gap by stressing and clarifying the much tighter bonds between military action and diplomacy in limited wars. . . . The author’s approach really proves its worth in explaining the debacle of the second Iraq war. His analysis of the co-optation of intelligence, the virtual crippling of the National Security Council, and systemic organizational flaws is both compelling and deeply troubling. . . . Bakich has opened a rich new vein of research into international relations in matters of war and peace. Success and Failure in Limited War will inform and guide future students of civil and military decision-making in crisis and conflict for years to come.” (John Arquilla, US Naval Postgraduate School Michigan War Studies Review)

“Bakich addresses an important puzzle—the sources of mixed strategic success in US experience with limited wars since World War II—by advancing a novel argument concerning the role of ‘information institutions.’ Success and Failure in Limited War provides a very useful framework that both complements the mountain of historical and decision making literature on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as integrates emerging insights from many insiders regarding contemporary decision-making in the two Iraq wars. The real payoff: Bakich compensates for gaps in the dominant realist, domestic politics, and constructivist arguments.” (Adam N. Stulberg Georgia Institute of Technology)

“Well-researched. . . . Bakich’s theoretical approach proves to be a useful tool in discovering some of the causes for success or failure and lays out very clearly how flaws in a state’s information institutions can have disastrous consequences in limited war. He gives policy makers and thinkers places to look to find hidden dysfunctions and provides a very convincing case against stove piping and relying too much on a sole institution for analysis.” (RealClearDefense)

“Bakich has given us a ‘must read’ study: he brilliantly explains how information flows (and their absence) definitively shape the success of wartime decision making and he provides a highly readable history of the limited wars that have consumed US foreign policy over the past sixty years. Policy makers, scholars, and students alike will find this book invaluable.” (Jeffrey W. Legro University of Virginia)

“Even more than most enterprises, limited wars are characterized by uncertainty, and Bakich’s great contribution is to focus on the role of institutions that gather and process information in influencing their outcomes.  With a good theory involving both diplomats and the armed forces and thorough case studies, this book is both fascinating and important.” (Robert Jervis, Columbia University author of "Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War")

“Bakich here offers a rigorous and well researched study, which makes the link between analysis of foreign policy, strategic studies, and international relations.” (Stéphane Taillat Politique Étrangère (France))

"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Comprar nuevo Ver libro

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America

Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

Añadir al carrito

Los mejores resultados en AbeBooks

1.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: The University of Chicago Press, United States (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
Librería
The Book Depository
(London, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción The University of Chicago Press, United States, 2014. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Language: English . Brand New Book. Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft. Nº de ref. de la librería AAH9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 28,09
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

2.

Bakich, Spencer D.
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Cantidad: 2
Librería
GreatBookPrices
(Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 20878710-n

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 30,39
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 2,24
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

3.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: The University of Chicago Press, United States (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 1
Librería
The Book Depository US
(London, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción The University of Chicago Press, United States, 2014. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Language: English . Brand New Book. Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft. Nº de ref. de la librería AAH9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 32,68
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

4.

Bakich
Editorial: Univ of Chicago
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Tapa blanda Cantidad: 1
Librería
C. Clayton Thompson - Bookseller
(BOONE, NC, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Univ of Chicago. Estado de conservación: BRAND NEW. BRAND NEW Softcover A Brand New Quality Book from a Full-Time Bookshop in business since 1992!. Nº de ref. de la librería 2550933

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 33,13
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

5.

Bakich, Spencer D.
Editorial: University of Chicago Press (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Cantidad: 3
Librería
Books2Anywhere
(Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción University of Chicago Press, 2014. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería WG-9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 24,30
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 10,11
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

6.

Bakich, Spencer D.
Editorial: Univ of Chicago Pr (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Cantidad: 10
Librería
Paperbackshop-US
(Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción Univ of Chicago Pr, 2014. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book. Shipped from US within 10 to 14 business days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería TX-9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 31,42
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 3,38
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

7.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: The University of Chicago Press
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 3
Librería
THE SAINT BOOKSTORE
(Southport, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción The University of Chicago Press. Paperback. Estado de conservación: new. BRAND NEW, Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars, Spencer D. Bakich, Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft. Nº de ref. de la librería B9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 27,42
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 7,80
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

8.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: University of Chicago press
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Cantidad: > 20
Librería
INDOO
(Avenel, NJ, Estados Unidos de America)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción University of Chicago press. Estado de conservación: New. Brand New. Nº de ref. de la librería 022610771X

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 32,78
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 2,97
A Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

9.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: University of Chicago Press 2014-03-21, Chicago (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos paperback Cantidad: 1
Librería
Blackwell's
(Oxford, OX, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción University of Chicago Press 2014-03-21, Chicago, 2014. paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 29,24
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: EUR 6,74
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

10.

Spencer D. Bakich
Editorial: The University of Chicago Press, United States (2014)
ISBN 10: 022610771X ISBN 13: 9780226107714
Nuevos Paperback Cantidad: 10
Librería
Book Depository hard to find
(London, Reino Unido)
Valoración
[?]

Descripción The University of Chicago Press, United States, 2014. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Language: English . This book usually ship within 10-15 business days and we will endeavor to dispatch orders quicker than this where possible. Brand New Book. Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft. Nº de ref. de la librería BTE9780226107714

Más información sobre esta librería | Hacer una pregunta a la librería

Comprar nuevo
EUR 38,91
Convertir moneda

Añadir al carrito

Gastos de envío: GRATIS
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío

Existen otras copia(s) de este libro

Ver todos los resultados de su búsqueda