Best Truth - Tapa blanda

"Most books on the intelligence community are about the past. This one is about the future. Integrating a profound knowledge of the US government, world affairs, and information technology, Berkowitz and Goodman brilliantly chart what the intelligence community must do to remain relevant in this decade of change." Kenneth W. Dam, Former Deputy Secretary of State Confronted by the new challenges of the information age and the post-Soviet world, the U.S. intelligence community must adapt and change, say the authors of this provocative book. They examine recent intelligence failures, show why traditional approaches now fall short, and call for fundamental reform in the organisation and approach of America's intelligence agencies. "Berkowitz and Goodman are pros at the intelligence business. Their proposals for updating the intelligence community are radical but anything less than radical won't do." Leslie Gelb "Berkowitz and Goodman know their subject and raise the right issues. An important look at intelligence in the information age." Joseph S. Nye, Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and Don K. Price Professor of Public Policy "Written by two intelligence officers-turned-academics, this slim volume calls for a sea change in both the culture and structure of the CIA... Will surely spark debate." Choice

Confronted by the new challenges of the information age and the post-Soviet world, the U.S. intelligence community must adapt and change. And marginal change is not enough, the authors of this provocative book insist. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman call for fundamental, radical reforms in the organization and approach of America's intelligence agencies. They show why traditional approaches to intelligence fall short today, and they propose thoughtful alternatives that take into account recent changes in information technology and intelligence requirements. An information-age intelligence service would move away from a rigid, hierarchical structure toward a more fluid, networked organization, the authors explain. They recommend a system that would utilize the private sector-with its access to more capital and its ability to move more quickly than a government organization. At the same time, this system would encourage government intelligence operations to concentrate on the specialized, high-risk activities they are uniquely able to perform. Berkowitz and Goodman examine recent failures of the intelligence community, discuss why traditional principles of intelligence are no longer adequate, and consider the implications for such broad policy issues as secrecy, covert action, and the culture of the intelligence community.